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2Abstract
This paper draws together four related strands of theory to address the processes of corporate
value creation. Specifically, contributions from resource-based theory, dynamic capabilities,
corporate strategy and Mintzberg’s structure theory have been combined to derive four
congruent resource-creating strategies: financial control, scale, leverage, and creativity.
Mintzberg’s configurations approach is used to explore the organisational structures and
processes associated with each strategy. It argues that choices with respect to corporate
resource creation must be made as these four strategies require distinct, congruent
organisational arrangements. When congruent strategies deliver diminishing returns,
divergent strategies may be pursued. However, there is a risk of incoherence where a
divergent strategy is poorly implemented.
3Congruent, Divergent and Incoherent Corporate Level Strategies
The resource-based view1 provides insight into the stock of value creating resources inside
the firm. More recently, this literature has been augmented by contributions which focus on
the processes of resource creation, termed dynamic capabilities2. Typically these arguments
are addressing firm or strategic business unit level strategy, as the value of resources is
discussed in terms of their contribution to the achievement of competitive advantage. But
these theoretical developments offer us an opportunity to re-visit corporate level strategy. In
what follows we draw on insights from the resource based view, dynamic capabilities, the
corporate strategy literature3 and the notion of configurations to develop four coherent
corporate resource creating strategies. They are coherent in two respects. First, the structures
and processes associated with their implementation are internally supportive, and second
corporate level and SBU level strategy are aligned.
We then argue that at some point in the development of the corporation a particular congruent
configuration will exhaust its value creating potential. This leads us to speculate on the
possibility of divergent strategies where there are fundamental differences of strategic
orientation at corporate and SBU level. We then explore the implications for leadership if
successful divergent strategies are to be implemented.
Four Congruent Configurations
Drawing on recent contributions to the resource based view, particularly the notion of
dynamic capabilities we can suggest that there are four distinct modes of corporate value
creation. Each of these modes exploits particular dynamic capabilities to create new corporate
value creating resources, which may be located within the SBUs or they may be at the
4corporate centre. Three higher level capabilities identified by Teece et al, (reconfiguration,
replication and learning) have informed an exploration of the organisational consequences of
enacting these capabilities.
1) Financial Control: here the centre causes SBU resources to be developed
through the setting and administering of tough financial controls. Appropriate
capabilities include SBU acquisition and resource allocation routines,
accompanied by a process of provoked learning within SBUs.
2) Scale: the centre delivers the resource by reconfiguring support activities
and/or core processes to exploit economies of scale.
3) Leverage: the centre creates new SBU resources through replication, by
codifying and transferring know-how that originates from the centre, or from
SBUs.
4) Creativity: the centre encourages and facilitates learning that leads to product
or process innovation. Here the centre is aiming to set up “webs of
collaboration” across the corporation.
These can be viewed as alternative corporate strategies, and each one is likely to call for a
particular combination of organisational structures and processes. Mintzberg’s4 notion of
configurations can help us draw out the organisational implications of theses differing
corporate value creation strategies. Mintzberg argues that there are congruent combinations
of structures, and processes that match particular sets of contingent conditions. Five of the
5six commonly occurring configurations he describes can be regarded as essentially firm-level
phenomena (the entrepreneurial, machine, professional, missionary and adhocratic
configurations). The multidivisional structure is his sixth configuration, which we are
attempting to elaborate here by exploring the structural and process implications of these
different corporate level strategies.
Drawing on the concept of configurations, we can identify the differing design parameters
that are likely to be associated with each of these corporate strategies. The resulting
alignment of strategic intent and organisational structures and processes we label a congruent
corporate strategy.
The idea of congruent configurations can be traced back to the early empirical studies of
organisations conducted by, for example Chandler, Burns & Stalker and Lawrence &
Lorsch5. Miles & Snow6 and Mintzberg have developed the approach, and in the strategy
field Porter7 could also be seen to be pursuing a configurational argument.
The reason for adopting this approach here is rooted in a belief that strategy and structure
should not be treated as separate phenomena. A strategy will have distinct and particular
organisational requirements if it is to be realised. So realised strategies and structures are
inextricably connected. Organisational structures and processes should be regarded as partial
descriptions of realised strategy, or, to put it another way, intended strategy is enacted
through extant structures and processes. Therefore, although intended strategies8 can exist in
an ideal form, realised strategies cannot. With intended strategies we can detect likely
mismatches between strategy and structure, but with realised strategies structures and
processes become part of the description of strategy. If we are able to establish feasible links
6between our four strategies and organisational structures and processes, this lends weight to
the argument that the strategies are not merely ideal constructs.
Insert Table 1 about here
In Table 1 we have suggested that each strategy requires distinct combinations of design
parameters. We have adapted Mintzberg’s original set of parameters, and have focused on
those most likely to vary by corporate strategy. These are:
 SBU strategy autonomy
 SBU performance measures
 Co-ordination across levels (between the centre and SBUs)
 Co-ordination across SBUs.
Table 1 also explains the role of the centre in each strategy, the location of “resources”, and
the requirement for SBU similarity if the strategy is going to add value. It also suggests
which dynamic capabilities are likely to be in evidence. Moreover, there are some parallels
between each strategy and Mintzberg’s original work, because each strategy can be
associated with a predominant co-ordination mechanism, and a predominant part of the
organisation. Figure 1 depicts each strategy with adaptations of Mintzberg’s original ‘logo’.
We can now explore the required configurations for each resource creating strategy in more
depth, starting with the financial control strategy.
Insert Figure 1 about here
7Financial Control
A familiar strategy adopted by diversified conglomerates, the financial control strategy
creates SBU resources through a tough governance regime. The setting of stretching targets
provokes learning in the SBUs, which have autonomy over means, or strategy, but not ends.
Co-ordination between the centre and the SBUs is minimal, as is co-ordination across the
disparate collection of SBUs in the portfolio. The prime co-ordination process is the
standardisation of financial outputs. The key part of the organisation is the strategic apex that
sets the targets, and changes the mix of SBUs. Critical is the application of managerial skills,
which are transactionally focused on detail and require disciplined application from both
Centre and SBU managers. The relentless nature of continuous attention to the numbers
requires an uncompromising sense of diligence.
Hence classic examples of financial control groups were diversified conglomerates such as
Hanson, Tomkins, and the old forms of BAT Industries and GEC (now renamed Marconi).
Less diverse groups such as Saatchi & Saatchi and WPP have applied the rules of this
configuration in their initial rapid growth strategies.
Scale
Here reconfiguration of core or support activity results in resource creation at the centre. If
support functions are consolidated to achieve cost reductions there is no strong requirement
for SBU strategies to be strongly co-ordinated. However, where SBU activities are closely
coupled to centralised core processes then strong co-ordination is required between the
centralised activities and the remaining sub-set of activities that are conducted in SBUs. For
example, the SBUs may be restricted to geographically distributed sales and service activity,
having to rely on centralised manufacturing processes. At the centre, co-ordination is effected
8through direct supervision of support and/or core activities to ensure the achievement of scale
advantages. The centralised operating core and the line management who control it are the
key parts of the structure. The style of management adopted is hierarchical (top down) and at
times, blatantly so, in order to highlight the philosophy of centralisation. In circumstances of
resistance confrontational rather than co-operative approaches to conflict resolution are likely
to be more effective.
This configuration is utilised by several industries which have undergone, or are still in the
process of, major consolidations in order to reduce costs or gain critical mass for key business
processes (e.g. automotive manufacturing, pharmaceuticals and financial services).
Leverage
In the leverage strategy the centre’s role is to replicate knowledge-based resources across the
mix of SBUs. Thus the centre is required to identify, codify and transfer know-how. SBUs
have some strategy autonomy, but they would be required to adopt standardised systems, and
to co-operate with other SBUs in the replication process. Thus Mintzberg’s technostructure,
those staff at the centre engaging in the replication processes, are the key part of the
organisation. Leadership rather than good management is required, as promoting knowledge
replication will involve attention to contextual factors. Although the centre challenging the
‘moves’ of each SBU in the organisation would be received as unwelcome, the unique nature
of each unit is likely to make the pursuit of managerial templates unlikely.
Businesses which are trying to replicate specific skills from one area or SBU are utilising the
leverage configuration. Several fast moving consumer goods groups (such as Unilever,
Procter and Gamble, Nestle and Philip Morris) and the Disney group have sought to leverage
9their brand management and customer service expertise across a wider range of products and
sectors. For instance, Nestlé’s acquisition of Rowntrees has led to a dramatic development
and extension of core confectionery brands like Kit Kat and Polo.
Creativity
Here learning within SBUs is encouraged and supported by the centre, but in addition the
centre engenders cross-SBU dialogue. The key part of the organisation is the culture, or
ideology. Values of collaboration, and sharing information and ideas in the corporate interest
are critical. SBUs should have complementary knowledge and experience sets that can spark
off each other to create new ideas. These may be profitably developed within existing SBUs,
or indeed new SBUs may need to be established to exploit the new resource. Similar to the
leverage strategy, new and further learning is likely to be achieved through leadership by
example, thus promoting a climate of open dialogue and challenge. Senior management need
to live the corporate philosophy of creativity and dynamism by making themselves available
for feedback and exhibiting a robustness for the ‘cut and thrust’ of ideas exchange.
Creative configuration groups include 3M, Canon and Cisco where maintaining the culture of
the organisation is seen as the critical role of the centre. Interestingly, but not surprisingly,
this configuration becomes even more challenging as the business succeeds and grows. This
is particularly true where this success is based on a single product range (e.g. Microsoft and
Intel), and the business may, by default, migrate to the leverage configuration with a greater
degree of direct intervention from the centre. The company may need a significant
restructuring if it desires to move back to its original creative configuration, so as to maintain
its original winning culture and value system.
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Incoherent Strategies
As is clear if one reads across the rows of Table 1, each strategy is distinct in the
organisational structures and systems it requires. This may suggest that where there is clarity
concerning the corporate value adding strategy, the corresponding congruence of the design
parameters may be associated with good performance. Conversely mismatches between the
espoused corporate strategy and the design parameters may lead to poor results. Moreover,
where corporate management strive to achieve the benefits of more than one value adding
strategy the relevant design parameters may be compromised, resulting in an incoherent
strategy. Thus one key conclusion from this configuration argument would be that corporate
executives need to be very clear on the predominant resource creation strategy they are
pursuing. This is because the realisation of the selected strategy requires a particular set of
organisational arrangements, and failure to align corporate processes according to the
demands of each strategy is likely to be sub-optimal. Similarly, attempts to pursue two
resource-creation strategies simultaneously may well result in disappointment, as in the
absence of appropriate structures and processes, further resource development is likely to be
constrained.
However, scrutiny of the table suggests that some strategies may co-exist without too much
conflict between the required design parameters. For example, one might envisage a
corporation pursuing leverage and creative strategies simultaneously without undue conflict
between the parameters: both require the centre to establish a culture of co-operation across
levels and between SBUs, where SBU goals would reflect both financial and non-financial
performance, and both require some complementarity across the mix of SBUs.
11
We might envisage conflicts where the espoused strategy is creativity, but the pressures
experienced by SBU management may well be those associated with a financial control
strategy. Similarly, where SBU autonomy is severely constrained by the requirement to use
corporate resources, as in the extreme scale style of configuration where core processes have
been centralised, setting tough bottom line targets to SBU management which are more suited
to the financial control style may be extremely de-motivating. In Figure 2 we have positioned
the four strategies according to the extent of SBU strategy autonomy they permit, required
SBU similarity, and the co-ordination requirements. We have located two versions of the
scale strategy: Scale 1 refers to the consolidation of support functions, and Scale 2 refers to
the achievement of scale economies in core processes.
This mapping of the strategies on these dimensions suggests where the tensions between
strategies might primarily stem from. Where strategies are adjacent in Figure 2, we could
conclude that they might be pursued concurrently without exerting undue tensions and
conflicting demands on the organisation’s structures and processes. The corporate executives
could therefore direct attention to minimising the effects of these design parameter
compromises.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Sustainability of Corporate Strategies
Adopting an RBV, and specifically a dynamic capabilities approach to corporate strategy
enables us to explore the nature and durability of some sources of corporate advantage. We
might suppose that these sources of advantage would vary in the extent to which they can be
replicated. It would seem that certain corporate capabilities are more susceptible to imitation
than others. For instance, we might expect that the consolidation of generic activities to
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reduce certain overhead costs (as in the Scale 1 strategy), might be readily replicable by rival
corporations. But when we consider the leverage strategy, the capability to identify a
knowledge resource, to codify it, to identify where else it may give advantage, and to create
the climate that facilitates the embedding of this know-how in other SBUs, we might
conclude that this capability may be very difficult to replicate.
Similarly, the ability to foster the climate of trust, required in the creative configuration, one
where staff from different SBUs would feel free to collaborate, and where the pervading
culture supports innovation and countenances “failure” may be corporate advantages that are
very difficult to copy.
The sustainability of corporate advantage is likely to depend on both the quality of strategy
execution, and the ease with which the strategy can be imitated. As argued earlier one critical
dimension of execution is the alignment or congruence of the design parameters set out in
Table 1, with the espoused strategy. The key parameters as set out in Figure 2 are likely to be
SBU autonomy, performance measures, and co-ordination across levels, and across SBUs. A
lack of coherence is likely to lead to a reduction in the effective delivery of the espoused
strategy.
The ease with which the strategy can be imitated will be determined by the same variables
that prevent resources from being imitated e.g. social complexity, embeddedness,
codifiability, path dependency etc. We might expect that some of these strategies are
inherently more imitable than others. Table 1 orders the strategies in this way, the control
strategy is assumed to be the easiest to replicate elsewhere, the creative strategy being the
most difficult. However, to suggest that the control regime may be the easiest to replicate
13
may be correct in general terms, but this would not preclude a corporation from enacting this
strategy in a highly specific, non-imitable way. But the main thrust of this argument is that
the strategies to the left of Table 1 are generally more understandable, and their
implementation is more straightforward than those to the right of the table.
One of the four strategies is likely to be inherently more constrained than the others. This is
the scale strategy, because this strategy produces finite resources in the form of centrally
managed processes. In contrast, the control, leverage and creativity strategies may be
extendable across a wide range of SBUs. Many disparate businesses could benefit from a
tough financial control regime, procurement skills could be leveraged across a wide variety of
firms, and differing combinations of complementary SBUs can be brought into creative
dialogue.
However, we would expect that at some point a particular congruent strategy would produce
diminishing returns. For instance, scale resources are exhausted as the minimum efficient
scale is achieved, or opportunities to leverage established resources into other SBUs have
been fully exploited. Or there could be few further gains to be had from a control regime, or
know-how advantages have been fully realised or the creative benefits from combining
different knowledge and experience across the SBUs have been played out. Once these
diminishing returns to a strategy have set in what can the centre do to rejuvenate the
corporate resource creation process?
The corporate centre could try to significantly change the composition of the SBUs
comprising the group. Divesting any divisions which are no longer enjoying a value
enhancing relationship with the centre, and acquiring appropriate new businesses which can
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benefit as part of the existing corporate configuration, may rejuvenate the corporate resource
creation process.
However, this reapplication of the existing congruent strategy works well for only two of our
corporate configurations. The control configuration and the scale 1 configuration (where
support activities have been centralised) can rotate their portfolios of SBUs and continue to
create value because their corporate centres already require acquisition dynamic capabilities
(as shown in Table 1). Also, individual SBUs within these configurations have a relatively
low level of integration within the group and minimal co-ordination is required across the
SBUs in such groups. This makes it much easier to unbundle any particular SBU from the
businesses remaining within the group. The realisable value of the divested businesses is
likely to be closer to its full economic value due to the emphasis in both these configurations’
performance measures on the individual SBUs stand-alone profitability.
The increased levels of co-ordination and integration in the other configurations make it more
difficult both to divest existing SBUs for full value and to regularly add significant acquired
SBUs, as opposed to developing new SBUs organically within the group. At this point there
is little further benefit to be had from the continuation of the congruent strategy. This is
where the possibility of “divergent” strategies emerges.
Divergent Strategies
In a divergent strategy the centre pursues a value adding strategy that appears to be at odds
with the embedded strategy pursued within the SBUs. For example, if the SBUs have been
pursuing creative strategies that have run their course, the centre changes its focus to try to
achieve scale or financial control advantages. Similarly, where cost advantages have been
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fully exploited, the centre shifts attention and focus to the encouragement of know-how
creation.
These alternatives are diagrammatically represented in Figure 3. The vertical axis of Figure 3
distinguishes where changes in the focus of the corporate centre take place. Thus, the
corporate centre could change its focus from Creativity to Financial Control because it
believed that the value creation potential of its original configuration was fully played out.
The horizontal axis considers whether the composition of the SBUs within the group has
changed. This juxtaposition suggests four possibilities, ranging from “no change” with the
inevitability of diminishing returns in the long term, to “all change” with the probable result
of great confusion within the group. The divergent corporate strategy means that the
corporate centre is challenging the SBUs in a very different way. This could be achieved
simply by changing the performance measures used within the group. For example, in a
group that had been implementing a creative configuration strategy, the SBU performance
measures would emphasise the adherence to corporate values, the degree of collaboration on
new cross-divisional ventures and the sharing of complementary knowledge with other SBUs
and the centre. A divergent corporate strategy could be introduced by changing to
performance measures that emphasised the profitability of individual SBUs.
Insert Figure 3 about here
This change would probably result in a rapid movement towards internal transfer pricing and
royalty agreements for any shared knowledge or collaborative ventures, together with a much
harder financial evaluation of any cross-divisional initiatives, and rigorous questioning of the
real value added by adhering to the corporate ‘values’. In some creative groups, where a lack
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of financial rigour and challenge has resulted in wasteful expenditures, such a divergent
corporate strategy may initially create substantial added value. However, the sustainability of
this type of divergent strategy can be questioned, as can the current corporate centre’s
capabilities to implement this type of change successfully.
A potentially more sustainable divergent strategy can be where the group has been
implementing a very tough financial control regime across its range of SBUs. The emphasis
on financial performance of individual SBUs normally results in a limited degree of
integration among the SBUs and, for this type of corporate configuration, this is not a
problem. However if this corporate strategy is now reaping diminishing returns so that
individual SBU performance cannot be significantly further improved, the corporate centre
may wish to implement a divergent corporate strategy.
This could take the form of seeking to leverage existing resources more widely across the
group. Thus the centre now needs the dynamic capabilities of replication and transferring,
which involve identifying which existing resources have a wider potential application and
then codifying these into explicit knowledge so that they can be shared among the other
relevant SBUs. As with the previous example this transformation requires both that the
corporate centre changes its dynamic capabilities quite significantly as well as altering the
performance measures used within the group. However the resulting strategy, if successfully
implemented, is much more sustainable. Clearly, a constraint on the possibilities for
leveraging know-how here is the diversity of the SBUs. Some rationalisation and re-grouping
may be required to avoid the imposition of inappropriate systems onto some SBUs where
these add no value.
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It is therefore not surprising that divergent corporate strategies often coincide with a change
in the top management at the corporate centre, although there are examples of these divergent
strategies being implemented by existing management teams. The marketing services group,
WPP, would appear relatively recently to have migrated away from its original financial
controls configuration to the more integrated, but also more value adding, leverage
configuration. The challenge for the corporate centre is to maintain a positive creative
tension between itself and the SBUs during this dramatic change, rather than allowing the
situation to degenerate into value destroying confusion as SBU managers struggle to cope
with the new roles and expectations within the group.
The most dramatic opportunity for major confusion in a group can be achieved by changing
both dimensions of Figure 3 at the same time. In other words, the corporate centre changes
its configuration at the same time as it radically changes the composition of the group. This
would appear to be at the heart of the recent problems of Marconi (GEC as was), and to have
contributed to the corporate problems at both BT and ICI. However, changing both
dimensions could work, if the group acquires businesses for which its new corporate
configuration should be relevant and value adding. In practice neither the corporate centre
nor the SBUs (and certainly not the shareholders and other stakeholders in the group) now
have any clear frames of reference or relevant experience to rely on; consequently the top
right hand box of Figure 3 tends to result in an intolerable level of confusion across the group
with a consequent destruction of shareholder value.
Insert Figure 4 about here
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The challenges of these creative tension strategies are great, and they are unlikely to flourish
unless a congruent strategy has been played out. This is because the individual SBUs within
the group need to have a strongly embedded strategy orientation, so that the new conflicting
orientation can play off against this established momentum. In the absence of this embedded
stability the pursuit of divergent strategies would just cause confusion, and result in the
destruction of shareholder value.
This is diagrammatically illustrated in Figure 4 where the long term diminishing returns from
any single corporate configuration are shown as the flattening curve of shareholder value
creation over time. As the curve flattens, the possibility of a change in the focus of the
corporate centre becomes more attractive. However, it is critical for the continued creation of
shareholder value that the change in focus is to a value adding divergent strategy rather than
to a value destroying incoherent strategy, under which confusion is generated by the
excessive disruption caused by changing both the corporate centre configuration and the
composition of the group at the same time.
Conclusion
We have set out an approach to corporate level strategy derived from the recent developments
in RBV, notably the notion of dynamic capabilities. Three higher level capabilities identified
by Teece et al, (reconfiguration, replication and learning) have informed our exploration of
congruent resource creating strategies. Corporations can create resources, through
reconfiguration, by consolidating support activities, and by centralising core processes to
achieve scale advantages. New resources can be created at SBU level where existing know-
how is replicated, which we have referred to as the leverage strategy. SBU-level learning can
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be encouraged by the corporate centre, as in the creativity strategy, or it can be provoked by
the financial control strategy.
Through an exploration of the likely organisational requirements of each strategy, and
drawing on Mintzberg’s configurational approach, we concluded that some of these strategies
could feasibly be pursued in tandem, but other combinations were not feasible. Pursuing any
congruent strategy vigorously will eventually result in a slowing of the resource creation
process. We suggested that corporations could explore divergent strategies which would seek
to develop resources in different ways to the embedded congruent strategy. Finally, using
standard RBV reasoning, we explored the sustainability of each strategy. The next challenge
is to empirically explore these ideas. This could be done through an examination of extant
cases of corporations, or through the gathering of fresh data.
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Table 1 Four Configurations
Financial Control Scale Leverage Creativity
Dynamic Capabilities (Provoked) Learning
Acquisition,
Resource Allocation
Acquisitions
Process and Product
Development
Replication,
Transferring
Connecting, Learning
Collaborating
SBU Strategy Autonomy Autonomy on means not ends Constrained by process
provision
Constrained by standard
processes
Constrained by core
values
SBU Performance Measures Profitability Mixed; e.g. cost reduction
plus sales targets
Plural, including
conformance to systems
Plural, including
adherence to corporate
values
Co-ordination across levels Minimal Strong, if core processes
centralised
Required re:
standard systems
Shared values
Co-ordination across SBUs None required Standard processes Co-operation in knowledge
transfer
Sharing ideas,
collaborating on new
ventures
SBU Similarity Can benefit from control regime Same activities Can benefit from same
systems
Complementary
knowledge
Role of Centre Operates financial control regime Performs activities Codifies and transfers
know-how
Encourages creativity
across SBUs
Predominant
co-ordinating mechanism
Standardisation of financial
outputs
Direct supervision of
standardised activities by
centre
Standardisation of systems
and skills
Standardisation of
values
Predominant part of the organisation Strategic apex Centralised operating core
and middle line
Technostructure Culture/ideology
Location of created resources SBUs Centre SBUs SBUs
Design
Parameters
Financial Control
HQSame: Control Regime
A B C D
Scale 1
Same: Central Support Activities
HQ
A B C
Support
Process
Scale 2
Same: Core Process
HQ
Core Processes
A B C
Leverage
Same: SBU Systems
HQ
Techno-
structure
A B C
Creativity
HQ
A
B
C
Complementary Knowledge
Figure 1: Four Resource Creating Strategies
Figure 3: Introducing Divergent Corporate Strategies
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Figure 2: Comparing the Strategies on Four Design Parameters
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Figure 4: Diminishing Returns to Congruent Strategies
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